Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of Sanitation
("Unformed Sanitation II")
426 F.2d 619 (2nd Cir. 1970)
Facts
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Uniformed Sanitation I," (392 U.S. 280), the Department of Sanitation employees who had been terminated were reinstated to their jobs on August 21, 1968.
The day they returned to work, they were summoned once again to appear before departmental management. They were informed that they had the right not to incriminate themselves, but that they could be subject to disciplinary action for failure to answer questions relating to the performance of their duties. They were also informed that any answers they would give, or any information which was gained as a result of their answers, could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.
Despite the affirmation of use/derivative use immunity for their answers, they still refused to respond. They were then terminated once again, for refusing to answer the questions.
The parties returned to district court, which issued a summary judgment directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees.
The day they returned to work, they were summoned once again to appear before departmental management. They were informed that they had the right not to incriminate themselves, but that they could be subject to disciplinary action for failure to answer questions relating to the performance of their duties. They were also informed that any answers they would give, or any information which was gained as a result of their answers, could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.
Despite the affirmation of use/derivative use immunity for their answers, they still refused to respond. They were then terminated once again, for refusing to answer the questions.
The parties returned to district court, which issued a summary judgment directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees.
Issue
Was it improper to terminate the employees for refusing to answer questions on the grounds of self-incrimination?
Holding
Reversed. The district court erred in directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees.
Reasoning
- ". . . 'use immunity' suffices for the discharge of public employees who 'refuse to account for their performance of their public trust'" (626).
- "Granted that under Garrity the threat of dismissal constitutes compulsion, such a public employee given use immunity is not being required 'to be a witness against himself'" (626).
- " . . . 'use immunity' . . . suffices to permit the discharge of a public employee who refuses to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination . . ." (626).
- ". . . if a public officer is asked about the performance of his official duties and is not required to waive immunity, the privilege is not a bar to his dismissal for refusal to answer" (627).
- "The proceeding here involved no attempt to coerce relinquishment of constitutional rights, because public employees do not have an absolute constitutional right to refuse to account for their official actions and still keep their jobs; their right, conferred by the Fifth Amendment itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply that neither what they say under such compulsion nor its fruits can be used against them in a subsequent prosecution" (627).
Commentary
In this sequel to Uniformed Sanitation I, the employees returned to work vindicated. But, after guaranteeing use/derivative use immunity for the employees' statements, the Commission continued their investigation. Now protected, the employees no longer faced the possibility of self-incrimination and therefore could not refuse to answer.
This is a key lesson for public employees today: once "use/derivative use" immunity is assured, you can no longer refuse to cooperate.
This is a key lesson for public employees today: once "use/derivative use" immunity is assured, you can no longer refuse to cooperate.
