Spevack v. Klein
385 U.S. 511 (1967)
Facts
Attorney Solomon Klein was investigated by the New York state bar association for professional misconduct. As a part of that investigation, he was served with a subpoena to produce certain financial records and to testify at an inquiry.
Klein refused to produce the financial records or to testify, arguing that doing so would tend to incriminate him.
As a result of his asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred.
Klein refused to produce the financial records or to testify, arguing that doing so would tend to incriminate him.
As a result of his asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred.
Issue
Was the disbarment of the petitioner proper in light of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself?
Holding
Reversed. The disbarment order was not proper.
Reasoning
- The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment "should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it" (514).
- The New York courts relied on a Supreme Court precedent, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), which held that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. However, the Cohen v. Hurley interpretation was overturned by 1964's Malloy v. Hogan, which held that "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement—the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence" (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), at 8). So in other words, the New York court decision was no longer in line with the U.S. Supreme Court.
- "In this context 'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly'" (515).
- "The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion . . ." (516)
- "We find no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to others" (516).
Commentary
Issued by the United States Supreme Court on the same day as Garrity v. New Jersey, these two cases were paired for obvious reasons.
In this case, the penalty of disbarment was viewed as sufficiently coercive to impinge upon Klein's rights. This is interesting in light of numerous later court decisions, mainly at the state level, that narrowed the allowable scope of the penalty further and further. The interpretation in Spevack v. Klein, that any sanction which makes invocation of the Fifth Amendment "costly," indicated a broad view of the definition of compulsion. The United States Supreme Court would retain this broad view throughout its subsequent related decisions. It is therefore interesting that some Circuit Courts of Appeals and state courts would find otherwise.
In this case, the penalty of disbarment was viewed as sufficiently coercive to impinge upon Klein's rights. This is interesting in light of numerous later court decisions, mainly at the state level, that narrowed the allowable scope of the penalty further and further. The interpretation in Spevack v. Klein, that any sanction which makes invocation of the Fifth Amendment "costly," indicated a broad view of the definition of compulsion. The United States Supreme Court would retain this broad view throughout its subsequent related decisions. It is therefore interesting that some Circuit Courts of Appeals and state courts would find otherwise.
